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CASES NOTED
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORTS - ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF
PUBLIC HOSPITALS - Holt v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio App. 2d 119, 212 N.E.2d
630 (1964). - Plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant for personal
injuries sustained while plaintiff was a patient in a municipally owned and operated
hospital. The hospital is associated with the University of Cincinnati College of Medi-
cine and its staff is composed of members of the College of Medicine faculty who are
permitted to use the hospital facilities and charge fees to the patients treated. The only
persons admitted to the hospital are patients of the doctors on the staff of the college.
The defendant asserted governmental immunity as a defense but the court held that
governmental immunity is based on the use and availability of the hospital to the public
at large and not to a selected segment of the public. In the absence of proof of unre-
stricted public use, judgment must be rendered against the municipality in its proprietary
capacity.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE - MANDATORY AGE RETIREMENT - DIs-
CHARGE FOR JUST CAUSE - Marcua v. Ohio Match Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 95, 212
N.E.2d 425 (1965). - Appellee, a former employee of the defendant company was
involuntarily retired at age sixty-five pursuant to a closed-shop labor contract between
the company and a local union. Appellee applied to the Ohio Bureau of Unemploy-
ment Compensation for unemployment benefits which were denied. The court, in a
case of first impression at the appellate level, affirmed the denial, stating that compul-
sory retirement pursuant to the labor contract was a discharge for "just cause in connec-
tion with his work" and thereby rendered the employee ineligible for unemployment
benefits. The court observed that employees accepting contractual benefits, such as
pensions, must also abide by their contractual duties, even those arising from a closed-
shop agreement.
NEGLIGENCE - MINOR DEFECT IN STEP ON PRIVATE PREMISES - No LIABILITY
ON OWNER OF PREMISES FOR SUCH DEFECT - Helms v. James Dickey Post No. 23,
American Legion, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 2d 60, 213 N.E.2d 734 (1966). - Plaintiff brought
a negligence action against the defendant for personal injuries sustained when the heel
of her shoe was caught in a defective stairway on defendant's property. The defect
consisted of an irregular hole about one-fourth inch in diameter and one-half inch in
depth in one of the steps. In a 4-3 decision, the majority of the court sustained defen-
dant's demurrer, ruling that the condition of the sidewalk was a slight defect which as
a matter of law, did not form the basis for a charge of negligence to be decided by a
jury. The court stated that the owner or occupier of private premises is not an insurer.
WITNESSES - CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS -
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE - Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp.
793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). - Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for inducing
a physician to breach the confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the phy-
sician by disclosing information related to the physician by the plaintiff-patient. The
court held that as a matter of public policy an implied promise of secrecy exists between
a physician and patient and that this promise extends beyond the privilege of prohibit-
ing the physician from testifying in court on matters disclosed through the physician-
patient relationship. In addition, the court stated that once the physician-patient
relationship is established, a contract between the parties arises and that an implied
condition of the contract is the doctor's warranty "that any confidential information
gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient's permis-
sion .. " The court went on to hold that a third party who induces a physician to breach
this duty may be held liable for damages to the patient.
INCOME TAX - DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION - EXPENDITURES BY LESSOR TO AC-
QuIRE RENEWAL OF A LEASE - Bender v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 189 (N.D.
Ohio 1965). - Plaintiff-lessors, purchased several lots adjoining their leased premises,
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razed the buildings thereon, and constructed a parking lot, for the sole purpose of ac-
quiring a long-term renewal of a lease from their food market tenant. In a case of
first impression, the court held that the demolition costs, broker's commission, and
legal fees, as well as the total purchase price of the lots in excess of the appraised market
value of the land, were capital expenditures attributable to the securing of the new
lease and entitled lessors to depreciation deductions which could be amortized over the
life of the lease pursuant to section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
BANKRUPTCY - CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION - GOOD FAX!H REQUIREMENT -
In the Matter of Liberty Mortgage Corp., 245 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ohio 1965). -
Debtor's petition for corporate reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
was dismissed for failure to satisfy that portion of the act's good faith requirement which
demands a reasonable expectation that the plan of reorganization can be effected. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 141, 146, 52 Stat. 887 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (1964). The
court observed that the debtor's business of buying real estate and then reselling it on
land contract could not possibly generate suffident cash flow to permit acquisition of
new properties for resale. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reorganization which
could effect no more than a protracted plan of liquidation failed to meet the good faith
test of the Bankruptcy Act
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARMED SERVICES - WILLFUL FAILURE TO REPORT FOR
INDUCTION - United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874 (D. Conn. 1965). -
Defendant was convicted of willful failure to report for induction into the armed ser-
vice in violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. In denying de-
fendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, the court stated that the
personal belief of an inductee that the United States is committing crimes against peace
and humanity, and is violating treaties concerning war and self-determination is no
defense to a charge of willful refusal to report for induction.
)ONSTrrTIONAL LAw - SELF-INCRIMINATION - COMMENT BY JUDGE - State v.
McRae, 4 Ohio App. 2d 217, 211 N.E.2d 875 (1965). - The defendant was con-
victed in common pleas court of grand larceny. During its deliberations the jury asked
the court whether or not the state could have required the defendant to take the wit-
ness stand and testify. In response to the question, the trial judge answered by quot-
ing article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution which states that "No person shall
be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." The court of ap-
peals held that the judge's comment was not improper in the light of Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and did not prejudice or imply guilt on the part of the
defendant.
LABOR RELATIONS - CONTRACTS - ARBITRABILiTY - WHO DETERmNEs -
Strauss v. Silver Cup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1965. - The plaintiff-com-
pany brought suit to compel arbitration of a proposal to cut back deliveries under a con-
tract clause providing for arbitration of "all disputes." The union refused, claiming the
proposal would eliminate fifty-five jobs and was excluded from arbitration by an ex-
emption clause. The court held that where there are two equally plausible clauses in a
contract, one providing for arbitration of disputes and the other denying it in specific
cases, the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide. The intent of the parties
at the time the contract is drafted governs, and the court is not reaching the merits of
the controversy through an indirect procedure when it passes on the scope of an exclu-
sionary clause.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS - LIABILITY OF CITY
FOR INJURY RESULTING FROM NUISANCE - Gabris v. Blake, 5 Ohio App. 2d 57,
214 N.E.2d 247 (1966). - While attempting to cross a street at a crosswalk plain-
tiff was impaled by a metal strip protruding from the side of a passing police cruiser.
Plaintiff brought an action against the city. The court held that while the city is im-
mune from liability based on the police officer's negligence because the officer was
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performing a governmental function, the city was nevertheless liable for maintaining
a nuisance on the streets in violation of Ohio Revised Code section 723.01 requiring
the city to keep the streets free from nuisances. The court found that the meaning of
nuisance within the statute was not limited to conditions in the physical structure of
the street or public grounds, but rather that it extended to such things as police vehicles
operating on the streets.
NEGLIGENCE - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - FAILURE TO KEEP STREETS FREE
FROM NUISANCE - Fritz v. Columbus, 5 Ohio St. 2d 53, 213 N.E.2d 930 (1965).
- Plaintiff brought suit against the city of Columbus contending that the city created
a nuisance by erecting a yield-right-of-way sign which the city had no duty to erect and
which was obstructed by trees. It was alleged that the city's negligence in failing to
keep the sign free from obstructions was the proximate cause of a collision between
plaintiff's driver and a truck which failed to yield the right of way. The court held
that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action since an obstructed sign is in fact no sign
at all, and failure to erect a sign could not constitute a nuisance; therefore, the city was
protected by governmental immunity.
LICENSES AND TAXES - REGULATION - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Solomon v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 31, 212 N.E.2d 595 (1965). - Appellant, Liquor
Control Commission, confiscated, without a search warrant, bottles of liquor from a
bar and subsequently held a hearing and ordered suspension of the liquor permit for
violation of the Liquor Control Act which prohibits dilution of whiskey. The appellee
contended that the confiscated liquor was inadmissible as evidence since it was illegally
obtained. The court held that when one applies for a liquor permit he agrees to the
provisions of the Liquor Control Act which permits full inspection of his premises.
Accordingly, the bottles of liquor were lawfully obtained and properly admitted into
evidence.
CONTRACTS - MONOPOLIES - INJUNCTION - CIVIL PROCEDURE - Perrytoo
Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965). - Appellant,
while engaged in the retail jobber business, encouraged five of appellee's employees to
terminate their employment with appellee and become employees of the appellant. Each
of the five employees had the express intent of taking their customers with them when
they quit appellee's firm and joined appellant's company. The court held that in an
industry relying heavily on an experienced sales force and knowledge of a customer's
particular needs, the successful inducement of a competitor's trained employees to change
jobs and to bring with them the customer lists, routes, and business methods of their
former employer, is a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONTEMPT - Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). -
Petitioner refused to answer certain questions put to him by the grand jury on the
ground of self-incrimination. He was then taken before the district court, which di-
rected him to answer after he was guaranteed immunity from prosecution. Petitioner
again refused to answer and was held in contempt under Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
overruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), on the ground that petitioner's
request for a hearing should have been granted under Rule 42(b) because 42(a) was
not intended to cover the present fact situation but rather, was designed to provide a
swift remedy for "exceptional circumstances . . . such as acts threatening the judge or
disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings."
WITNESSES - EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - DEPOSmONS - Parks v. Ford,
4 Ohio St. 2d 61, 212 N.E.2d 569 (1965). - Plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident with the defendant who subsequently died. The trial court denied the plain-
tiff the right to testify as to certain matters contained in the defendant's deposition.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the plaintiff could testify on her own behalf with
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respect to competent and relevant matters contained in the deceased defendant's deposi-
tion which had been taken by the defendant's attorney and properly filed in an action
before the defendant's death, and which was admissible into evidence.
INJUNCrION - EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO ENJOIN USE OF CONFIDBNTIAL INFORMA-
TION OBTAINED BY FORMER EMPLOYEES - David Fox & Sons, Inc. v. King Poultry
Co., 47 Misc. 2d 672, 262 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1964). - Plaintiff, a wholesale
poultry supplier, sought to enjoin two former employees from solicitation of all his
customers by the employees from lists they had compiled while in his employ. The
court granted the injunction nothwithstanding the lack of any employment contract
prohibiting such action by the employees, stating that an employee in a position of trust
and confidence gains an unfair competitive advantage not available to others in the
industry when he obtains such confidential information. The court further held that
the defendants were not enjoined as to any customers which they had brought with
them to plaintiff's employ since such a practice was common in the industry.
CRIMINAL LAW - ABORTION - CRIMINAL INTENT NECESSARY ELEMENT - People
v. Abarbanel, 48 Cal. Rep. 336 (1965). - Defendant, a medical doctor, was charged
with conspiracy to commit an illegal abortion and with committing an illegal abortion.
He was acquitted of the first count but convicted of committing an illegal abortion.
On appeal the court held that the criminal intent necessary to support a conviction of
committing an illegal abortion is present when the abortion was performed for a purpose
other than to save the mother's life. The applicable standard is whether the doctor in the
good faith exercise of his best skill and understanding believed that the abortion was
necessary to save the mother's life. Since the defendant-doctor had been acquitted of
the conspiracy charge, it follows that the evidence could not show any criminal intent
necessary to support the abortion charge.
PHYSICrANS AND SURGEONS - NEW TRIAL - Morse v. Rapkin, 24 App. Div. 2d 24,
263 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1965). - Plaintiff sued defendant-dentist for injuries sustained
because of the defendant's lack of qualification for the type of dental procedure prac-
ticed and for departure from accepted dental practices. Defendant caimed, inter alia,
that plaintiff's failure to follow his instructions as to oral hygiene caused or contributed
to any condition from which plaintiff might be suffering. The appellate court held
that the trial court erred when it charged the jury that the plaintiff must be free of con-
tributory negligence in order to recover. Where the crux of the action is improper
treatment, the patient's failure to follow instructions does not defeat the action. If plain-
tiffs failure to follow instructions increased the extent of the injury, the damages that
could be recovered should be reduced. Plaintiff's alleged negligence does not lessen
the effect of the original wrong.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES - CAUSAL CONNECTION
BETWEEN HEART ATTACK AND WORK-LOAD - Theil v. Industrial ComM'n, 1 Ariz.
App. 455, 404 P.2d 711 (1965). - Petitioner, widow of a deceased employee-
comptroller of an insurance company, applied to the Arizona Industrial Commission
for workman's compensation death benefits which were denied. The decedent, age 30
at his death, was devoted to his job and was emotionally involved with the company's
problems. The company's burdensome financial position prompted the deceased to work
long hours (up to eighteen hours per day) and sometimes over entire weekends. After
suffering one mild heart attack the decedent decreased his work-load, but less than one
month later he died of another attack. Medical testimony indicated that there was a
direct causal relationship between the decedent's job and his death. Accordingly, on
appeal the court ruled that under Arizona law the petitioner was entitled to death bene-
fits.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION - APPEAL - CLAIMED ERROR NOT PREVIOUSLY PRE-
SENTED TO REvIWING COURT - City of Toledo v. Reasonover, 5 Ohio St. 2d 22,
213 N.E.2d 179 (1965). - Defendant was tried and convicted of driving while under
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the influence of intoxicants. He appealed the conviction on various grounds, and not-
withstanding that he did not assert the ground that the sentence was too severe, the
court of appeals found the sentence excessive and accordingly reversed and remanded
the case. On appeal by the City of Toledo to the Ohio Supreme Court, the defendant,
relying on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), a case which was decided after
the court of appeals had rendered its decision in the instant case, contended that the
court of appeals' decision should be affirmed because the trial court erred in permitting
the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to take the witness stand and tes-
tify. The Ohio Supreme Court held that where the sentence imposed by a trial court is
within the limits authorized by appropriate ordinance and statute the court of appeals
cannot hold that there was an abuse of discretion. The Ohio Supreme Court further
held that after the decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), every defendant
who considered that he had been prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment on his failure
to testify should promptly raise that question, and since defendant's case was submitted
to the court of appeals after Malloy, he waived his claim to error by not raising the
question at that time.
